Overall logic holds true (if perception is 'rigged' people dont want to play). But individual logic... is very different.
(Heck, if you dont want for perception to change, just dont catch me, copper..
Bail me out.
)
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The stuff I find titillating here is, that big financial investors - OBVIOUSLY preempt the market by trying to get information early even by miliseconds - and not all of what they do can be explained away as 'generally available to the clever investor advantage'.
Second the failover stops like - if stock index drops too much, trading is halted. (Stopping cascading effects, but...) (Actually, same logic as with corona applies, you are trying to slow down the rate of doubling of perceived negative worth.. Thats rigging.
(But for the benefit of all' (Who dont like stock market busts.)).)
Third - so the regulation logic must be along the lines of "a few big players you can regulate" a bunch of a little smaller ones following self serving individual logic you cant - so you have to establish a "culture" for them?
Might actually be workable..
But then I fall back on - why can lets say someone in a national security commite not act like Douglas Fink? Because of conflict of interest and too much potential of 'market making' (less individual risk)? In this very second I find this fascinating..
edit: The other way around sheds a little more light. If someone 'big' is perceived as 'always a little early' in a way that is COPYABLE by many other market actors, the system breaks (people will not decide based on market logic, but based on sidegame logic). So that is what you are trying to prevent.
If big player rigs market in a way that isnt replicatable by many other players, you try to regulate him differently by doing something to his overall profit margin. Maybe slap em on the hand if they are playing too fast and loose...
So complexity becomes the differentiator.
Am I wrong?